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Executive Accountability and National Security
Lorna Woods OBE, Lawrence McNamara and Judith Townend∗
The protection of national security has traditionally been an exception to general norms of pub-
lic accountability, based on prerogative powers. The last three decades have seen efforts to bring
national security closer to the normal constitutional control mechanisms of parliament and the
courts.The design of and changes to mechanisms of accountability have,however,been accepted
without discussion of the often narrower purposes for which they were first established (most
notably for oversight of surveillance), the extent of their departure from constitutional princi-
ples,or their impact in embedding new forms of exceptionalism in the constitutional framework.
This article critically assesses these developments, prompted for example by the Law Commis-
sion’s recommendations to reform official secrets laws,which adopted trusted intermediary and
indirect accountability models without full consideration of historical and contemporary con-
cerns or the exceptionalism on which they were based.Though focused on the UK,our account
provides a cautionary tale for national security law reform in any modern democracy.
INTRODUCTION
The British constitution is based on the accountability of the executive to par-
liament with an independent judiciary ensuring compliance with the law. Tra-
ditionally an exception to these general norms of public accountability, the
protection of national security constitutes an area where information flows are
tightly controlled and the executive can act without approval of the legislature
and where judicial intervention will be rare and limited. Secrecy has been de-
manded to protect the national interest, though this and national security are
terms which can cover a range of interests and arise in many different contexts.
From the late 1980’s there have been moves to bring national security mat-
ters closer to the normal constitutional control mechanisms of parliament and
the courts, changes vital and valuable for a modern democracy in which the
executive is accountable for its actions. Nevertheless, by no means did the un-
derpinning of the security and intelligence agencies (SIAs) by statute and the
introduction of external oversight constitute a golden age of transparency and
responsibility.1 Given the sensitive nature of national security, the shift towards
∗Respectively, Professor of Internet Law, University of Essex; Reader in Law, University of York;
Senior Lecturer in Media & Information Law, University of Sussex. The authors are grateful to
numerous people for the comments we received on drafts at various stages, including Simon Halliday,
Jenny Steele,Pablo Iglesias-Rodriguez and the three anonymous reviewers for this journal.We would
also like to thank our colleagues at the Information Law & Policy Centre at IALS, which provided
the forum for our early discussions of the ideas in this article.
1 Shortcomings had long been identified; for example HC Deb vol 222 cols 131-138 29 March
1993; HC Deb vol 222 col 940 15 April 1993.
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ordinary standards and processes has inevitably been incomplete. Indeed, con-
cerns about the need to counter terrorism have given rise to state calls for
further powers, especially in the light of technological developments, and a re-
assertion of the need to keep these capabilities and their deployment secret in
the service of national security. This process has seen measures and models put
in place seeking to balance the competing imperatives.These are different from,
if not inconsistent with, the usual mechanisms to ensure governmental account-
ability,which ordinarily require considerable openness and transparency.2 Many
of these measures, as they have emerged, have been subject to criticism.3 What
is lacking in the existing scholarship is a focus on the ways that, as the law has
been reformed, changes in the mechanisms of accountability on the basis of
the exceptional nature of national security have been accepted and replicated,
the circumstances in which they are used expanded, and, taken together, the
consequences for the constitutional settlement. It is only as time has passed that
the full extent of this has become apparent.
This article argues that there has been an increase in oversight and trans-
parency measures that rely on ‘trusted intermediaries’ in the area of national se-
curity, establishing a model that is repeatedly redeployed and normalised.While
re-using existing approaches may seem uncontroversial, even sensible, our con-
cerns arise because those developments become treated as unproblematic once
adopted and then used as a model going forward in wider contexts. The focus
2 Cabinet Office, Ministerial Code (August 2019), paras [1.3] and [1.7] at https://www.gov.uk/
government/publications/ministerial-code. All URLs last visited 11 August 2020 unless other-
wise noted.
3 For example on the role of the judiciary, including special advocates and closed material pro-
cedures: D. Feldman, ‘Human Rights, Terrorism and Risk: The Role of Politicians and Judges’
[2006] Public Law 364; J. Ip, ‘The Rise and Spread of the Special Advocate’ [2008] Public Law
717; G. van Harten, ‘Weaknesses of adjudication in the face of secret evidence’ (2009) 13 In-
ternational Journal of Evidence and Proof 1; A. Kavanagh, ‘Special Advocates, Control Orders and
the Right to a Fair Trial’ (2010) 73 MLR 836; A. Tomkins, ‘Justice and Security in the United
Kingdom’ (2014) 47 Israel Law Review 305; C.Walker and G. Lennon (eds),Routledge Handbook
of Law and Terrorism (London & New York,NY:Routledge, 2015) esp ch 8,B.Dickson, ‘Terror-
ism and Legal Accountability’ and ch 18, D. Jenkins, ‘The Handling and Disclosure of Sensitive
Intelligence: Closed Material Procedures and Constitutional Change in the Five Eyes Nations’;
M. Chamberlain QC, ‘Special Advocates and Amici Curiae in National Security Proceedings
in the United Kingdom’ (2018) 68 University of Toronto Law Journal 496; L. Graham, ‘Statutory
secret trials: the judicial approach to closed material procedures under the Justice and Security
Act 2013’ (2019) 38 Civil Justice Quarterly 189. On review mechanisms: D. Anderson, ‘The In-
dependent Review of Terrorism Laws’ [2014] Public Law 403; J. Blackbourn, ‘Evaluating the
Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation’ (2014) 67 Parliamentary Affairs 955; K. Roach
and C. Forcese, ‘Bridging the National Security Accountability Gap: A Three-Part System to
Modernize Canada’s Inadequate Review of National Security’ Ottawa Faculty of Law Work-
ing Paper 2016-05, 31 March 2016. On oversight of the intelligence agencies: J. Ip, ‘Terrorism
laws and constitutional accountability’ in Walker and Lennon, ibid, 99; S. McKay and J. Moran,
‘Surveillance Powers and the Generation of Intelligence within the law’ in Walker and Lennon,
this note, above, 133; T. Hickman and A. Tomkins, ‘National security law and the creep of se-
crecy: a transatlantic tale’ in L. Lazarus, C. McCrudden and N. Bowles (eds), Reasoning Rights:
Comparative Judicial Engagement (London:Hart, 2014). The most notable recent attempt to bring
these together has been P. Scott,The National Security Constitution (London: Hart, 2018). Scott’s
thematic choices are citizenship, justiciability, secrecy and sovereignty. See also P. Scott, ‘Hybrid
institutions in the national security constitution: the case of the Commissioners’ (2019) 39 Legal
Studies 432.
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on the benefits of using an intermediary has over-shadowed the design con-
straints within which those intermediaries operate, and the limited extent to
which there is either accountability or transparency. The deployment of the
trusted intermediary model has had significant consequences, most notably a
lack of accountability to parliament, a limitation of transparency in the courts
(open justice) and a troubling re-shaping of the judicial role and function under
the constitution.
This discussion might have been prompted by any number of developments
in recent years. For example, the Snowden disclosures paved the way for a new
tranche of cases dealing with mass surveillance before both the European Court
of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) and
which resulted in the enactment of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 (IPA
2016).4 These cases build on earlier jurisprudence on covert surveillance which
themselves may have affected the approach to SIAs.5 While not expressly linked
to Snowden, we also note the consultation paper published by the Law Com-
mission of England andWales in 2017 which reviewed the law relating to official
secrets.6 It was striking because it was expressly premised on earlier develop-
ments in the area of national security. Crucially, those developments primarily
related to the oversight of surveillance, but the Law Commission applied them
to the wider management and protection of national security, both in the con-
sultation paper and in the subsequent much-delayed 2020 report.7 While the
consultation process led to a report that acknowledged some of the problems
with the original proposals, and had the effect of mitigating some of the more
deleterious possibilities, the Commission did not ultimately engage with the
deeper concerns we raise here. The issues and challenges are not purely his-
toric; Brexit, the pandemic, concerns about foreign electoral interference and
advances in facial recognition technology have demonstrated that major chal-
lenges will continue to arise with the consequent temptation to deploy these
models again.
We approach our inquiry by examining oversight in different institutions:
parliamentary oversight, including through the Intelligence and Security Com-
mittee (the second part of this article); judicial oversight through the courts
(the third part); and oversight by judicial commissioners,which has blurred the
boundaries between regulatory and judicial oversight (the fourth part). This
4 For example Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12 Digital Rights Ireland v Minister for Com-
munications, Marine and Natural Resources et al ECLI: EU:C:2014:238; Joined Cases C-203/15
and C-698/15 Tele2 Sverige AB v Post- och telestyrelsen and Secretary of State for the Home Depart-
ment v Tom Watson and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2016:970; Big Brother Watch v UK (Appl 58170/13,
62322/14), judgment 13 September 2018 (this judgment has been referred to the Grand Cham-
ber).
5 For exampleMalone vUK [1984] ECHR 10 (Malone);Halford vUK [1997] ECHR 32.Principles
relating to oversight and approval are also found in the wider European context: for example
Fundamental Rights Agency, Surveillance by intelligence services: fundamental rights safeguards and
remedies in the EU, Vol 1: Member States’ legal frameworks (Vienna: European Union Agency for
Fundamental Rights, 2017).
6 Law Commission of England and Wales, Protection of Official Data: A Consultation Paper Consul-
tation Paper No 230 (2017) (Law Commission,Consultation Paper).
7 Law Commission of England and Wales, Protection of Official Data Report No 395 (2020) (Law
Commission Report).
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approach recognises that there is no single chronological, institutional or sub-
stantive starting point, and that each is distinct but inter-connects with the
others. In each part, we demonstrate how a model has been developed and re-
used even though these mechanisms might be flawed, and the implications of
these changes for executive accountability. The conclusion draws these threads
together and presents some of the most significant implications that follow from
them.
Paying attention to these developments reveals how uncritical re-use of spe-
cial measures and models undermines the modern constitutional imperative of
executive accountability – the public interest in knowing that the government
is acting legally, ethically and consistently with the will and authority of par-
liament, in national security as in any other area. We show that a degree of
accountability can be achieved without general transparency, at least in specific
instances, but a systemic absence of transparency cannot foster public confi-
dence and poses risks that inadequate processes will persist and flaws remain
hidden.Ultimately, we argue that the incremental and inter-related exception-
alism is suggestive not merely of flawed and limited accountability mechanisms
but also of unacknowledged distinctions between transparency and accountabil-
ity,and a deeper,unspoken re-shaping of contemporary constitutional functions
and powers.
PARLIAMENTARY OVERSIGHT
A core function of parliament is to hold the government to account;8 minis-
ters are responsible to parliament for their departments’ actions.9 An essential
element of this accountability is the flow of information, underpinned by the
obligation on ministers to be truthful and as open as possible towards parliament
(and the public).10 Yet, while the SIAs were put on a statutory footing by the
Intelligence Services Act 1994 (ISA 1994) in an attempt to increase openness
and institute ‘proper arrangements for accountability’,11 substantial exception-
alism to the usual principles of parliamentary accountability in national security
remains.
A particular concern is the information advantage ministers (and sometimes
the Prime Minister) have over the rest of the legislature as these ‘arrangements
for accountability’ often give the executive the right to control the release of
information about the SIAs’ activities. Where oversight powers are positioned
within the executive, and oversight findings are closely held by it, there is a risk
that state failures will not be adequately revealed or addressed. This weakness
8 M.Rush,Parliament Today (Manchester:Manchester University Press, 2005) 3;HC Political and
Constitutional Reform Committee, Role and Powers of the Prime Minister HC 351 (2014) para
[52].
9 Resolution on Ministerial Responsibility, HC Deb vol 292 col 1046-1047 19 March 1997;
Ministerial Code n 2 above para [1.3(b)]. R. Brazier,Ministers of the Crown (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1997) 261-270.
10 In addition to general obligations, see for example Ministerial Code, ibid paras [1.3(d)], [9.1].
11 HC Deb vol 238 col 153 22 February 1994.
4
© 2021 The Authors.The Modern Law Review published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Modern Law Review Limited.
(2021) 0(0) MLR 1–28
Lorna Woods, Lawrence McNamara and Judith Townend
may undermine the ability of the legislature to assess or report on the working
of the system itself, in essence undermining the ability of parliament to hold
the executive to account.
Starting with section 94 of the Telecommunications Act 1984 and mov-
ing on to the reporting mechanisms in the Interception of Communications
Act 1985 (IoCA 1985), ISA 1994, the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act
2000 (RIPA 2000), and IPA 2016, we demonstrate both the executive control
over information made available to parliament and the risks of executive self-
oversight mechanisms subverting and limiting the effectiveness of parliamentary
control. Consideration of the reporting mechanism’s effectiveness, and the ex-
tent to which problems in its operation have been recognised and addressed, is
needed, yet debate has been sparse and for many years key information has not
been forthcoming.
We begin with section 94, even though now repealed, because concerns
arising from its operation – and specifically the impact of unrestricted exec-
utive control over information – have not been sufficiently considered. The
exceptions in the reporting mechanism can be seen now as problematic yet a
similar executive power over information flows arises in the models found in
subsequent statutes. In successive reforms, including the IPA 2016, information
asymmetry remains.When future proposals suggest reliance on oversight provi-
sions where the executive has control over what is reported to parliament these
deficiencies and especially the lessons of section 94 should be addressed.
Intertwined with this is the development since the Telecommunications Act
of a particular model for balancing national security secrecy interests with ac-
countability – the indirect accountability model – on which there is increas-
ing reliance.Rather than permit parliament direct access to information about
SIAs’activities, this model permits a trusted intermediary some access to operat-
ing information and the intermediary then reports to parliament. This indirect
form of accountability substitutes the principle of general transparency with
a principle of transparency to the trusted few. Transparency is in issue at two
stages: between the executive (including SIAs) and trusted intermediaries; and
between trusted intermediaries and parliament (or the general public). There
are constraints on both steps, but those at the second step in particular have
tended to be overlooked, and the consequent impact upon parliament’s ability
to hold the executive to account has not been fully considered.
Reporting by the Secretary of State
Section 94 of the Telecommunications Act 1984 needs some explanation be-
cause the provision and its workings have been somewhat obscure. Section 94
empowered the Secretary of State to make ‘directions of a general character’ to
any person in the interests of national security or international relations,which
could include a requirement that the person not disclose the existence or con-
tent of those directions.12 Although section 94 was amended in 2003 by the
12 Telecommunications Act 1984, s 94(1), (5).
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introduction of a test of necessity and proportionality, it remained a broadly
drafted power.13 Moreover, while the Secretary of State was required to ‘lay
before Parliament a copy of every direction given’, under section 94(4) the
Secretary of State was excused from so doing if he was ‘of the opinion that dis-
closure of the direction is against the interests of national security or relations
with the government of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom,
the commercial interests of any person’.
Arguably, section 94 was a product of its time, enacted when national se-
curity was generally still seen as a matter of prerogative power or a category
of information that government was simply entitled to keep secret;14 the ju-
risprudence from the ECtHR on surveillance was in its infancy.15 Nonetheless,
concerns were expressed. One MP observed: ‘the Secretary of State decides in
secret to give secret instructions to the Director General,who … is not allowed
to reveal those directions. This is a massive power to the Secretary of State and
… will be operating in total secrecy without any accountability to the House
of Commons. That is totally and utterly wrong in any sort of democracy.’16
The deployment of this exception eviscerated parliamentary oversight. Its
use depended on the individual understanding of the Secretary of State, and the
Act did not require the opinion to be reasonable or proportionate or take into
account any particular factors; seemingly it could be used even beyond national
security.17 Moreover, this evisceration was persistently hidden.When the statute
was amended in 2003 (in light of the Human Rights Act 1998), the extent and
nature of the use of section 94 directions was not mentioned by ministers. In
2012 the Joint Committee on the Draft Communications Data Bill could find
no information about section 94 directions, even though it sought it.18 In 2014,
the Home Affairs Select Committee noted that ‘there is no public disclosure
of how this is used ….’19 Similarly, although there was a potential overlap with
the RIPA 2000 regime, the use of section 94 directions for bulk data collection
does not appear to have been disclosed by ministers until March 2015.20 No
section 94 directions were ever laid before parliament, which suggests that the
section 94(4) exception was used in all instances.
With scrutiny limited,21 oversight of the executive was for many years
carried out by the executive itself. As the Interception of Communications
Commissioner (IoCC) subsequently noted, effectively the whole process was
13 Telecommunications Act 1984, s 94(2A), as amended by the Communications Act 2003.
14 HL Deb vol 449 col 1161 20 March 1984 (Lord Mackay of Clashfern).
15 Malone v UK n 5 above.
16 HC Deb vol 33 col 89 29 November 1982 (Bob Cryer MP).
17 Intelligence Services Act 1994, s 3(2)(c); Privacy International v Secretary of States for Foreign and
Commonwealth Affairs and Ors [2018] UKIPTrib IPT 15_110_CH (23 July 2018) at [73]-[77].
18 Report of the Joint Committee on the Draft Communications Data Bill HL 79 HC 479 (2012) para
[2].
19 Home Affairs Select Committee, Report on Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 HC 711
(2014) para [15].
20 This is implicit from the arguments put forward in Privacy International v Secretary of States for
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and Ors [2016] UKIPTrib 15_110-CH (17 October 2016) at
[13].
21 This problem was recognised in D. Anderson QC,A Question of Trust: Report of the Investigatory
Powers Review (June 2015) para [13.31], albeit in the context of RIPA 2000, Part 1.
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secret.22 The lack of oversight and the fact that decisions were in practice un-
likely to be challenged facilitated the broad interpretation the executive gave
the powers in section 94. An expansion in quantity and type of surveillance
techniques was thus enabled without the executive needing to disclose that ex-
pansion to parliament. This is an important lesson about the dangers of giving
unbounded control over information flows to the Executive, but a lesson that
has not been learned as the constraints imposed on the oversight Commission-
ers illustrate.
Reporting by a Commissioner
The year after section 94 was enacted, the UK, in response to the Malone case,
legislated to put surveillance by means of interception of communications on a
statutory footing; the issue of accountability was debated but extension beyond
the traditional techniques of ministerial accountability rejected.23 The Inter-
ception of Communications Act 1985 did, however, introduce an oversight
body: the Interception of Communications Commissioner (IoCC) whose role
was ‘to keep under review the carrying out by the Secretary of State of the
functions’ under the IoCA 1985.24 The IoCC was granted powers to request
information, though he had no powers to compel change. Though the effec-
tiveness of those information gathering powers was questioned,25 by 2016 it
was said that the IoCC’s office was ‘given access without reservation not only
to all the material they requested but to the Agencies’ own systems and to the
processes of the warrant granting department’.26 Significantly for transparency
and consequently also accountability, IoCA 1985 required the IoCC to pub-
lish a report on his activities, though the impact of the reports depended on
the scrutiny given to them. The Security Service Act 1989 (SSA 1989) and
ISA 1994 each instituted another commissioner, with similar roles in relation
to the operations of SIAs in general.27 At this stage the effectiveness of this
mechanism was questioned but dismissed on the basis that there was no evi-
dence it did not work.28 The surveillance regime was updated again by RIPA
2000, including the provisions related to the commissioners. When some sort
of oversight regime following Snowden was brought in for section 94 direc-
tions, it was these regimes that were co-opted.29 In each instance, the model was
one of indirect accountability based on a trusted intermediary with oversight
22 Half Yearly Report of the Interception of Communications Commissioner (Sir Anthony May) HC 308
(16 July 2015) 13-14.
23 Malone n 5 above; HC Deb vol 77 col 298 15 April 1993.
24 Interception of Communications Act 1985, s 8.
25 See for example HC Deb vol 38 col 782 6 March 2000 (Anne Widdecombe MP);HC Deb vol
381 cols 793-794 6 March 2000 (Harry Cohen MP).
26 Anderson, n 21 above, para [6.102].
27 Security Service Act 1989, s 4; Intelligence Services Act 194, s 8.
28 HC Deb vol 238 col 157 (and more generally cols153-244) 22 February 1994 (Douglas Hurd
MP).
29 The Intelligence Service Commissioner had been asked in 2010 to oversee on an extra-statutory
basis the activities of GCHQ in relation to s 94 directions, but even the fact of that oversight
was not made known until 2015 (Report of the Intelligence Services Commissioner for 2015 (Sir Mark
© 2021 The Authors.The Modern Law Review published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Modern Law Review Limited.
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obligations, a model which originated in IoCA 1985,was replicated in the SSA
1989 and ISA 1994, and retained in RIPA 2000.
Although an improvement in oversight in relation to section 94, weakness
existed. The commissioners’ reports did not necessarily constitute full disclo-
sure. First, since none of the section 94 directions were public it was difficult to
discuss them publicly.30 Secondly, and more generally, the commissioners had
to report annually to the Prime Minister,who was to lay the report before par-
liament.31 However, the commissioners could limit what was to be disclosed
to parliament.32 Additionally, showing information flow controls similar to sec-
tion 94(4), the Prime Minister could exclude from the report certain content.
Given the temporal proximity of section 94 and IoCA 1985, it may be that the
ideas behind the one influenced thinking about the other. By the time RIPA
2000 was enacted the list of grounds on which content could be excluded com-
prised not just the types of content mentioned in the foregoing statutes (notably
national security, detection or prevention of serious crime, and the economic
well-being of the United Kingdom) but also ‘the continued discharge of the
functions of any public authority whose activities include activities that are
subject to review by the Commissioner’.33 Given the large number of public
authorities which would fall within IoCC’s purview, this was a broad excep-
tion not necessarily connected to national security.Some of the other objectives
were phrased equally broadly but transplanted from earlier statutes into RIPA
2000. As with section 94(4), there is no requirement of reasonableness or pro-
portionality. Moreover, while the commissioners were to be consulted on any
redaction from the report and parliament had to be told if information had
been redacted (admittedly a crucial difference from the position under section
94(4)), the final decision on content lay with the Prime Minister.There was no
timescale for tabling the report, and no requirement that the Prime Minister
justify or explain any decision to delay or exclude material.
The de facto deference to the executive under section 94(4) had, in a ret-
rograde step, become a de jure deference under first IoCA 1985 and then its
Waller) HC 459 (8 September 2016)), 5. Responsibility was transferred to the IoCC in January
2015. Report of the Interception of Communications Commissioner (Sir Anthony May) HC 1113 (12
March 2015), section 10;Half-yearly Report of the Interception of Communications Commissioner (Sir
Anthony May) n 22 above, section 4;Report of the Interception of Communications Commissioner (Sir
Stanley Burnton):Review of directions given under section 94 of the Telecommunications Act 1984. Prior
to 2015, the position was opaque.The IoCC had earlier provided ‘limited non-statutory oversight
of [part of the safeguards relating to] one particular set of section 94 directions’ (emphasis in
original) and could say no more about that oversight: Half-yearly Report of the Interception of
Communications Commissioner (Sir Anthony May) ibid, para [4.6]-[4.7]. However, it is clear that
oversight arrangements were limited, partial, did not challenge the interpretation of s 94, and did
not cover all s 94 directions:Report of the Interception of Communications Commissioner (Sir Stanley
Burnton): Review of directions given under section 94 of the Telecommunications Act 1984, sections 4-5.
See also Anderson, n 21 above, para [6.104] and the Privacy International litigation notes 17 and
20 above.
30 Half-yearly Report of the Interception of Communications Commissioner (Sir Anthony May) ibid, para
[4.8].
31 RIPA 2000, s 58(4), (6).
32 This point was recognised in debates relating to the Intelligence Services Bill: HC Deb vol 238
col 153-244 22 February 1994.
33 RIPA 2000, s 58(7).
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successors, including RIPA 2000. The lessons from section 94 – particularly
regarding the breadth of the exception and the questions of who made the rel-
evant determinations and on what basis – were not considered at RIPA 2000’s
enactment, nor since. It may be that section 94 was seen not to be relevant
given that these were more general reporting obligations, taking place against a
warrant-based system and relying on the effectiveness of indirect accountability.
Alternatively, it could be that the use of section 94(4) and lack of oversight of
section 94 were not recognised by the parliament precisely because of the se-
crecy and obscurity surrounding the provision, and they were not disclosed by
the executive because section 94(4) provided the executive with total control
over information flow.
This model has been replicated in other contexts, including policing and
even beyond. In the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (PoFA 2012), two com-
missioners the Biometrics Commissioner (BC) and the Surveillance Camera
Commissioner (SCC) were introduced to deal with retention of DNA by the
police34 and the over-use of CCTV35 respectively.Accountability was achieved
through the provision of reports to the Secretary of State and thence to parlia-
ment. Material could be redacted in the reports of the BC on broad grounds
(including but not limited to national security)36, raising the usual concerns
about information flows.By contrast, the SCC appears as an aberration because
there is not (as yet) an equivalent restriction in respect of the SCC’s reports, but
the terrain covered by the SCC is much broader than that of the oversight
commissioners, covering not just public bodies but also the use of surveillance
cameras by private actors. Currently the Government is seeking to consolidate
the two commissioners into one appointment.37
The model of indirect accountability developed from IoCA 1985 through
to RIPA 2000 was again re-deployed when the surveillance regime was re-
constructed through the IPA 2016. The UK government claimed that the IPA
2016 introduced a ‘world leading oversight regime’38 but, while it may well
have introduced some significant safeguards controlling the use of surveillance
powers, the extent to which it ensures executive accountability to parliament
is questionable. As before, a key mechanism for such accountability is the an-
nual report of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner (the replacement for all
commissioners under previous acts) under section 234 of IPA 2016 on the car-
rying out of the functions of the Judicial Commissioners,who review executive
decisions to issue warrants. Despite the concerns about its predecessors,39 the
IPA 2016 still allows for self-censorship and reports are still subject to exec-
utive control. The IPC reports to the Prime Minister alone (despite attempts
in Public Bill Committee to change the reporting obligation to parliament).
The Prime Minister must publish the report and lay it before parliament, but
34 Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, s 20.
35 Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, s 34.
36 Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, s 21(5).
37 Commissioner for the Retention and Use of Biometric Material, Annual Report 2019, iii.
38 Home Secretary, Amber Rudd MP, ‘Investigatory Powers Commissioner estab-
lishes oversight regime’ 1 September 2017 at https://www.gov.uk/government/news/
investigatory-powers-commissioner-establishes-oversight-regime.
39 Anderson, n 21 above, paras [6.103] - [6.104], [12.79] et seq.
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can exclude matter on the same broad grounds as under RIPA 2000.40 The
Minister of State for Defence stated that any redaction would be made only on
national security grounds.41 If this is the case, then the other grounds should be
repealed.
The IPC’s first report provided coverage and scrutiny of numerous mat-
ters, including errors made in the exercise of powers.42 It was, however, opaque
about the reasoning and standards for decisions about whether errors were se-
rious enough to require a person to be notified and when national security
would preclude notification. In its 2018 Report, the perceived need to suppress
information is evident; the IPC, for example, reports being unable to supply
how many times the Consolidated Guidance to Intelligence Officers and Ser-
vice Personnel on the Detention and Interviewing of Detainees Overseas, and
on the Passing and Receipt of Intelligence Relating to Detainees was followed
because of the ‘sensitivity’ of the topic.43 Control of information apparently
stays within the hold of the executive.
In sum, the replication of earlier flaws of RIPA 2000 is apparent. Despite
Anderson’s praise for the IoCC’s reports there are still, as he also noted, con-
straints on transparency.44 It might be argued that the worst excesses of section
94(4) secrecy have been avoided as the fact of redaction is visible, but this still
leaves parliament at an information disadvantage vis-a-vis the executive.
The Law Commission in its consultation paper viewed the IPA 2016 as a
good model, referring to the IPC as a template for a statutory commissioner to
receive concerns and complaints from members of the security services about
the way those services are operating.45 The Commission observed that the
annual reporting obligation ‘would potentially include details of any investi-
gation’46 but did not consider the fact that historically these reports have not
gone into details of particular operations. In its subsequent report, the Commis-
sion maintained its view that a statutory commissioner should be used and that
the IPCO framework was an appropriate model.47 It acknowledged however
concerns about whistle blowers and freedom of expression (which it had not
addressed in its consultation paper).48 Rightly, the Commission saw as problem-
atic the options of reporting on whistleblower complaints to the PrimeMinister
or to the Intelligence and Security Committee (discussed below) because that
could lead to a public perception that the process is ‘internal’ not ‘external’.49
40 Investigatory Powers Act 2016, s 234(7).
41 HL Deb vol 774 col 630 19 July 2016.
42 Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office,Annual Report 2017 HC 1780 (31 January 2019).
43 Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office,Annual Report 2018 HC 67 (5 March 2020), 62.
44 Anderson, n 21 above, para [6.103].
45 Law Commission,Consultation Paper n 6 above, para [7.103] et seq.
46 ibid para [7.115].
47 Law Commission Report n 7 above, para [10.9].
48 Goodwin v United Kingdom (1996) 22 EHRR 123; Financial Times Ltd and Others v the
United Kingdom (2010) 50 EHRR 46; Sanoma Uitgevers BV v Netherlands (2010) 30 BHRC
318; Becker v Norway [2017] ECHR 834. See L. Woods, L. McNamara and J. Townend,




49 Law Commission Report n 7 above, para [10.36](3).
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However, the Commission does not identify core problems that underpin the
oversight system as a whole as regards executive control over information flows.
Moreover, there was no critical consideration of whether a model designed to
back up a warrant system is suitable for co-opting to a broader context and dif-
ferent purposes (criticisms seemingly being more practically focussed), though
the BC and SCC may in any event be precedent for this.50
Reporting by the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament
A further avenue of parliamentary oversight of the SIAs was introduced through
the ISC, established under the ISA 1994. This was a development from the ex-
isting regimes then in place under the IOCA 1985 and the SSA 1989 and
seemingly arose from a concern expressed in parliament about the effective-
ness of a model based on reporting to a minister. Despite this, we question the
degree to which the ISC counters executive control over information. It is an-
other example of the model of indirect accountability that relies on a trusted
intermediary with the weaknesses in transparency and accountability outlined
above.
The introduction of the ISC probably reflected a more general attitude that
the SIAs – now creatures of statute – should be more open and accountable
within the underlying constitutional framework. The ISC was established to
‘examine or otherwise oversee the expenditure, administration, policy and op-
erations’ of MI5, MI6 and GCHQ.51 In this, the ISC is a form of trusted in-
termediary. Yet, regardless of the ISC’s views about the way powers have been
exercised in any given circumstance,and any political effect it may have through
embarrassment to or pressure on the government following a report, executive
power cannot be limited or controlled by the ISC. There has been significant
criticism of the ISC, specifically as regards its independence. It remains a sui
generis committee rather than a standard parliamentary select committee and,
under the statute, subject to a degree of Prime Ministerial control.52 More-
over, its members often have held roles in the bodies they now oversee (for
example ministers and, via appointment to the House of Lords, former senior
officers in the agencies themselves) leading to concerns that the oversight body
in practice becomes deferential to those agencies’ assessments of legality, ne-
cessity and proportionality.53 The Home Affairs Committee saw the system as
weak, and ineffective, and that had ‘an impact upon the credibility of the [SIAs’]
50 Such concerns had some years earlier led the (then) government to reject the wider use of the
Interception Commissioner when RIPA 2000 was being enacted: HL Deb vol 615 col 386 13
July 2000 (Lord Bach).
51 Justice and Security Act 2013, s 2.
52 Justice and Security Act 2013, s 1. More generally see H. Bocehl, A. Defty and J Kirkpatrick
‘“New Mechanisms of Independent Accountability”: Select Committees and Parliamentary
Scrutiny of the Intelligence Services’ (2015) 68 Parliamentary Affairs 314; A. Defty, ‘Coming
in from the cold: bringing the Intelligence and Security Committee into Parliament’ (2019) 34
Intelligence and National Security 22.
53 A Democratic Licence to Operate: Report of the Independent Surveillance Review RUSI Whitehall Re-
port 2-15 (July 2015), paras [4.101]-[4.102].
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accountability, and … the credibility of Parliament itself.’54 That the ISC is
unique in Parliament is, yet again, suggestive that exceptionalism should be ac-
ceptable where national security is concerned.
Nonetheless, the ISC has at times appeared willing to hold the executive and
its agencies to account in a way that suggests the membership risks outlined
above have been mitigated: its 2018 inquiry into extraordinary rendition was a
landmark of scrutiny.55 However, it is information that is key – both the ISC’s
access to information and its ability to make this information available through
its reports – and in these regards the ISC faces significant hurdles both as regards
access to information and in its ability to make its report public.
There are severe limitations on the ISC’s ability to make agencies fully com-
ply with the obligation to share information in a timely manner56 and the Sec-
retary of State can deny the committee access to sensitive material (comparable
to the original limitations in section 94 and RIPA 2000).57 It is noteworthy that
the ISC seemingly only became aware of the use of section 94 as a result of the
Snowden disclosures58 and from its report on surveillance in the run up to the
IPA,59 it is unclear how much, if anything, the ISC was told about the use of
section 94 directions.Since the ISC is already a limited,pre-approved group this
limitation seems unnecessary and hobbles its effectiveness as a trusted interme-
diary.Although the ISC reports are now made to parliament – an improvement
on the original position – they are supplied in advance to the Prime Minister.60
The Prime Minister can require material to be excluded from any ISC report
if, after consultation with the ISC, he is of the opinion it would be prejudicial
to the ability of the SIAs to discharge their functions.61 For example, in Privacy
54 Home Affairs Select Committee,Counter-Terrorism HC 231 (30 April 2014), para [157] and An-
nex B [26] et seq. See also Lord MacDonald, ‘Proper Parliamentary Oversight of the Security
Services is Desperately Needed’ FA Mann Lecture, December 2013 at http://www.
democraticaudit.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/FAMann-lecture2.pdf . The risk of intel-
ligence powers being used for political purposes is widely recognised: see for example European
Parliament, Parliamentary Oversight of Security and Intelligence Agencies in the European Union PE
453.207 (2011) 88-89.
55 Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament Detainee Mistreatment and Rendition: 2001-
2010 HC 1113 (28 June 2018); Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, Detainee
Mistreatment and Rendition: Current Issues HC 1114 (28 June 2018).
56 Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament,UK Lethal Drones Strikes in Syria HC 1152
(26 April 2017); Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, Annual Report 2016-17
HC 655 (20 December 2017) 105-106; Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament
Detainee Mistreatment and Rendition: 2001-2010 ibid para [236]; HL Deb vol 799 cols 81GC-
83GC (Marquess of Lothian), 87GC (Lord Anderson of Ipswich), 95GC-97GC (Lord Paddick)
9 Sep 2019.
57 Justice and Security Act 2013, Sched 1, para 4.
58 John Hayes MP, answering written questions from David Davis MP, Electronic
Surveillance: Written question – 16310, 16312, 16313, 13 November 2015 at
https://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/written-questions-answers-statements/
written-question/Commons/2015-11-13/16310/.
59 Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament,Privacy and Security:A modern and transparent
legal framework HC 1075 (12 March 2015).
60 Justice and Security Act 2013, s 3(1), (7). Confidential reports may also be made directly to the
Prime Minister.
61 Justice and Security Act 2013, s 3(4).
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and Security: A modern and transparent legal framework, redaction occurred in the
part of the report dealing with section 94.62
Further, there are no requirements on when reports must be published.63
The risk that a publication could be delayed occurred in 2019 when the Prime
Minister’s office refused to publish an ISC report on Russian interference in UK
elections; no reason was given despite its salience given the impending General
Election.64 It would be ten months until publication;with the legislation setting
no deadline for the ISC to be established in a new parliament, the government –
by not making ISC appointments – was effectively able to delay the publication
of the Russia report and any new scrutiny.65 Where the ISCmakes reports other
than its annual report there is no requirement that the ISC lay those reports
before parliament. It is not clear whether the ISC needs to disclose the fact
it has conducted any such inquiry or made any report to the Prime Minister.
The 2013 JSA reforms made some improvements but it was a lost opportunity
to strengthen oversight. Concerns raised at the time of reform were seemingly
overridden by traditional concerns about the need for secrecy, just as they were
at the time the ISC was introduced.66
The ISC gained a power in the IPA: it can request an investigation by the
IPC.67 This power is, however, of limited effect because, again, an investigation
would only become public if included in ISC or IPC reports to parliament.
There was no recognition of the fact that executive control over information
that will be provided to the ISC could adversely affect the ability of parliament
to hold the executive to account.
The effectiveness and limits of parliamentary oversight
Overall we see a picture of national security oversight where traditional prerog-
ative exceptionalism has been replaced by a model of statutory exceptionalism
that uses indirect or even private approaches to accountability with its reliance
on a trusted intermediary (whether in the form of a commissioner’s report or
that of the ISC). It entrenches executive control over information flows. Parlia-
mentary reporting requirements are weakened so substantially that their ability
to achieve the accountability and oversight for which they were designed must
be called into question, particularly in times of crisis. The models have be-
come embedded, and largely taken for granted. The weaknesses of this model
– demonstrated over time – are overlooked all too easily, or evidence is not
62 Privacy and Security n 59 above, 100. Redaction markings are explained in the preface to the
report.
63 There is a Memorandum of Understanding between the ISC and the government about the
speed of response; the government does not always comply – see for example Intelligence and
Security Committee of Parliament,Annual Report 2017-18 HC 1692 (22 November 2018) para
[1].
64 HC Deb vol 667 col 647 5 November 2019 (Dominic Grieve QC MP); HL Deb vol 800 col
1097 19 November 2019 (Lord Anderson of Ipswich).
65 Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament,Russia HC 632 (21 July 2020).
66 See for example Intelligence Services Bill [Lords], 2nd Reading, HC Deb vol 238 col 153-244
22 February 1994, especially the concerns raised by Jack Cunningham MP, col 165 et seq.
67 Investigatory Powers Act 2016, s 236.
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available to support concerns.While the IPA 2016 overcame some weaknesses
in the oversight regime for SIAs, it did not address those that have long been
evident in the mechanisms that should provide for executive accountability to
parliament; the position of the ISC has not been revisited. The fact that the
Law Commission, while it accepts the importance of some form of disclosure
in relation to whistleblowing investigations (and even accepts a public interest
defence to criminal liability), does not engage with these weaknesses and un-
derlying executive control illustrates the point. When existing structures have
been adopted,as for example with regards to PoFA 2012, it also risks a repetition
of these weaknesses and their expansion into areas not inherently connected
with surveillance. This acceptance may be understandable, but not justifiable,
given that similar special treatment characterises other institutions that hold the
executive to account. Exceptionalism is also found in the courts, where over-
sight mechanisms are taken forward even though past experience should call for
caution.
OVERSIGHT IN THE COURTS
The courts, with an independent judiciary, ensure the executive is acting law-
fully and is accountable.68 They provide redress where action has been unlawful
and, through exposure during proceedings, shed light on acts of the state.69 Even
in the national security sphere, they provide oversight of executive power, even
if this is not complete.70 Yet pressure on open justice remains given the per-
ceived need for secrecy in the field of national security.
When national security issues arise, two main mechanisms have emerged to
manage them. One was the establishment of specialist tribunals, for example
the Proscribed Organisations Appeal Commission (POAC),71 the Special Im-
migration Appeals Commission (SIAC), and the Investigatory Powers Tribunal
68 For example X Ltd v Morgan Grampian (Publishers Limited) [1991] 1 AC 1, 48; Duport Steel v
Sirs [1980] 1 WLR 142, 157;R (on the application of UNISON) v Lord Chancellor [2017] UKSC
51 at [68] per Lord Reed; Lord Neuberger, Lord Mance, Lord Kerr, Lord Wilson and Lord
Hughes agreeing; R (on the application of Miller) v The Prime Minister [2019] UKSC 41 at [46]-
[47]; Constitutional Reform Act 2005, s 3.
69 For example much of what we know about the operation of s 94 has emerged in court pro-
ceedings; Privacy International v Secretary of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs and Ors n 17
above, esp at [6]; Report of the Interception of Communications Commissioner (Sir Stanley Burnton):
Review of directions given under section 94 of the Telecommunications Act 1984 HC 33 (7 July 2016)
para [8.17].
70 R v Secretary of State for Foreign & Commonwealth, ex parte Bancoult (No 2) [2008] UKHL 61;
R (Abbasi) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2002] EWCA Civ 1598;
Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 37 (the GCHQ case); T.
Poole, ‘United Kingdom: The royal prerogative’ (2010) 8 I.Con 146; A. Tomkins ‘Defining and
Delimiting National Security’ (2002) 118 LQR 200, 202-203;Mohamed, R (on the application of)
v Secretary of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs [2010] EWCA Civ 65 at [44] per Judge LCJ;
at [129], [131]-[135], [154], [189]-[191] perNeuberger MR;at [208], [262], [285], [290], [295] per
May PQBD; Lord Kerr, ‘“Only Parliament can do that”? The reliance of British jurisprudence
on the common law in the national security context’ [2015] Civil Justice Quarterly 244, 247.
71 Terrorism Act 2000, s 5; The Proscribed Organisations Appeal Commission (Procedure) Rules
2007, SI 2007/1286.
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(IPT).72 The other was reliance on special procedures, not just in the specialist
tribunals but also in the ordinary courts. The impact each of these approaches
has on individuals’ rights, open justice and the flow of information varies, and
their cumulative impact has not been considered.
The existence of specialist tribunals has, in providing a venue to decide issues
that could not be dealt with by the ordinary courts, to some extent improved
individuals’ ability to scrutinise and challenge executive decisions. The IPT has
been seen as part of the oversight mechanisms for the SIAs and therefore a step
forward in accountability. Moreover, the establishment of SIAC allowed some
individuals to seek judicial review of a Home Secretary’s decision to deport
them, albeit only in that specialist tribunal. Similarly, POAC hears challenges
(under judicial review principles) to the refusal by the Secretary of State to
remove an organisation from the list of proscribed organisations. From some
tribunals (for example, POAC), appeal through the ordinary appellate courts
is possible.73 While RIPA 2000 originally sought to limit individuals’ rights
of access to the general courts,74 the IPA introduced the possibility of appeal
against the IPT’s decisions.75 Nonetheless, the existence of these tribunals still
institutionalises the special treatment of executive action.
More worrying are special procedure mechanisms,which may be relied on in
the ordinary courts as well as in specialist tribunals. Although possibly limiting
the extent or effectiveness of judicial oversight, some special procedure mecha-
nisms respect the constitutional benchmarks of equality of arms and open jus-
tice. Public interest immunity (PII), for example, allows the executive to with-
hold evidence in a dispute,but the executive cannot rely on that evidence and so
equality of arms is not compromised; this may incentivise acceptance of open
justice. Courts can hold hearings in camera or impose reporting restrictions,
which may limit open justice, but only where necessary for the administration
of justice or, sometimes, to protect national security. Recent changes, however,
go to the heart of what constitutes a fair and open trial. We examine two in-
stances: in civil proceedings (including administrative) through the use of closed
material procedures; and in criminal proceedings through new approaches to
limiting access to hearings. These show how a procedure developed in one
context is re-deployed elsewhere.Moreover, as we detail below, the Law Com-
mission proposals in relation to official secrets adopt these models for use in a
new context without consideration of the extent to which retreats from fair
trials and open justice have consequences for executive accountability.
72 The Employment Tribunal is a fourth example and warrants more detailed and critical atten-
tion than can be given in this article. In particular, in national security matters it is subject to
Ministerial direction in ways that the others are not: The Employment Tribunals (Constitution
and Rules of Procedure) Regulations 2013, SI 2103/1237, reg 94.
73 Terrorism Act 2000, ss 5, 6.
74 RIPA 2000, s 67(8), however this was narrowly interpreted in Privacy International v Investigatory
Powers Tribunal [2019] UKSC 22.
75 Investigatory Powers Act 2016, s 242 (inserting s 67A into RIPA 2000).
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Civil and administrative proceedings: the rise of closed material procedures
Closed material procedures (CMPs) have emerged from processes designed to
manage deportation on security grounds76 which were found to be incom-
patible with the ECHR.77 While developed for use in SIAC, CMPs are also
available in POAC78 and the IPT has procedures in place that parallel them.79
Under CMPs, security sensitive information cannot be disclosed to applicants
or their lawyers. Instead, a ‘special advocate’ is appointed to represent the ap-
plicant in a closed hearing. The special advocate sees all the information on
which the state relies, but after seeing that information may not communicate
with the applicant or the applicant’s lawyers about the case.80 This introduction
of a ‘trusted intermediary’ into the process parallels that seen in the reporting
mechanisms under ISA 1994, RIPA 2000 and IPA. CMPs were established to
enhance rights protection; those subject to deportation were no longer vul-
nerable to executive control alone but would have an independent tribunal
and informed legal representation, albeit representation with whom they had a
different relationship.
The government has attempted to use CMPs in relation to security sensitive
material in broader circumstances: to defend civil actions brought by returning
Guantanamo Bay detainees alleging UK complicity in torture and rendition.
The Supreme Court, however, held that the courts had no general power to
permit CMPs.They were at odds with natural justice and open justice.81 CMPs
would only be available if statute permitted.82 The government subsequently
proposed legislation extending the use of CMPs to civil proceedings generally,83
even though the deficiencies of CMPs as they operated in SIACwere on record.
A special advocate commented that, ‘the public should be left in absolutely
no doubt that what is happening … has absolutely nothing to do with the
traditions of adversarial justice as we have come to understand them in the
British legal system’.84 However well motivated,representation in CMPs cannot
76 The background is well explained in HC Constitutional Affairs Committee,The Operation of the
Special Immigration Appeal Commission (SIAC) and the use of Special Advocates HC 323-I (3 April
2005) esp ch 4. See also Chamberlain, n 3 above, 496-503.
77 Chahal vUnited Kingdom (1997) 23 EHRR 413;Constitutional Affairs Committee,The Operation
of the Special Immigration Appeal Commission ibid.
78 The Proscribed Organisations Appeal Commission (Procedure) Rules 2007, SI 2007/1286.
79 The Investigatory Powers Tribunal Rules 2018 introduced (r 10(4)) a presumption towards
open hearings where possible, confirming the approach the IPT had developed for itself; cf
the Investigatory Powers Tribunal Rules 2000, r 9(6), that stated ‘The Tribunal’s proceedings,
including any oral hearings, shall be conducted in private’.
80 Special Immigration Appeals Commission (Procedure) Rules 2003, as amended.
81 Al Rawi v The Security Service and others [2011] UKSC 34.
82 ibid, for example at [69] per Lord Dyson,at [71]-[74] per Lord Hope,at [86]-[87] per Lord Brown),
at [95] per Lord Kerr.
83 Cabinet Office, Justice and Security Green Paper Cmd 8194 (2011) ch 2; the Justice and Security
Bill was subsequently introduced in 2012.
84 Nicholas Blake QC (later Mr Justice Blake and, since retirement, a Judicial Commissioner
under the IPA), evidence to the Joint Committee on Human Rights, cited in Justice and Security
Green Paper: Response to Consultation from Special Advocates 16 December 2011, para [12] at http:
//webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140911100308/http://consultation.cabinetoffice.gov.
uk/justiceandsecurity/wp-content/uploads/2012/09_Special%20Advocates.pdf . Chamberlain,
n 3 above, 505-508, looks at the concerns in some detail.
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be as effective as representation in ordinary proceedings. Controversially, the
effect of CMPs under the JSA proposals was not to safeguard rights but to
diminish them.Nevertheless,the JSAwas enacted,albeit with some safeguarding
amendments. Its procedures were quickly deployed beyond the narrow range of
cases for which it was ostensibly intended.85 It seems that where a mechanism
exists, it will be used (as was section 94(4) of the Telecommunications Act); a
point which should be taken into account when considering amendments to
the mechanism or its further redeployment.
The consequence of CMPs for accountability is complex. CMPs limit the
extent to which the executive is accountable through the courts as far as equal-
ity of arms and openness are concerned. Conversely, judges may see material
from the executive that might not otherwise come before judicial eyes. There
is a conflict between accountability that is public and accountability that is not
public, which has parallels with concerns about executive control over infor-
mation flows. Both require extraordinary degrees of trust in the executive and
judicial branches but the latter – non-public accountability – even if it could
be effective, is difficult to assess because of the secrecy that shrouds it.
The contraction of open justice in criminal proceedings
Developments in the past few years are eroding commitments to open justice
in criminal matters. Guardian News and Media Ltd & Ors v R & Incedal86 (In-
cedal case), which concerns terrorism-related offences, represents a significant
change in the acceptable management of criminal trials in the national security
context. It offers further evidence of diminished state accountability, with in-
sufficient regard to the public interest in open justice and an individual’s right
to a fair trial and is a dangerous precedent for case management more gener-
ally. The trial judge had imposed what was effectively total secrecy. This was
overturned on appeal, but restrictive conditions were imposed: the only public
proceedings would be the swearing in of the jury, the reading of charges, parts
of the introductory remarks to the jury, parts of the prosecution’s opening ad-
dress, the verdicts, and perhaps some of the sentencing remarks. Everything else
would be closed. In a novel arrangement, ten ‘accredited journalists’were to be
permitted to attend ‘the bulk of the trial’ and to take notes, which were not
to be removed from the court. Reporting restrictions were imposed.87 While
not formalised in the way that the oversight mechanisms in ISA 1994, RIPA
2000 and IPA 2016 were, there is a similar preference for relying on a small
group of trusted intermediaries who can only access and disseminate approved
85 Ministry of Justice,Use of Closed Material Procedure Reports at https://www.gov.uk/government/
collections/use-of -closed-material-procedure-reports; L. McNamara and D. Lock,Closed mate-
rial procedures under the Justice and Security Act 2013: A review of the first report by the Secretary of
State (with supplement) (London: Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law, December 2014).
86 Guardian News and Media Ltd & Ors v R & Incedal [2016] EWCA Crim 11;Guardian News &
Media Ltd v Incedal & Bouhadjar [2014] EWCA Crim 1861.
87 Guardian News and Media Ltd v AB & CD, [2014] EWCA Crim (B1) (12 June 2014) at [16], [19];
Dominic Casciani, ‘Erol Incedal: The Trial We Couldn’t Report’ BBC.co.uk 26 March 2015 at
https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-31989581.
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information, reducing transparency. At the end of the case the media unsuc-
cessfully applied for permission to report some detail from the closed part of
the trial.88 In the absence of accountability through open courts, the Court of
Appeal suggested that ‘public accountability’ could be achieved by the ISC, but
did not consider the limits on the ISC.89
The judgments reveal an ill-defined, sui generis approach with no statutory
basis. The trial judge relied on ‘ministerial certificates’ from the Secretaries of
State. Although not disclosed, the certificates were apparently similar to those
used in PII but, from the way the Court of Appeal refers to the certificates un-
derlying the in camera order, the mechanism is not the same as PII.90 Under PII,
if a fair trial requires disclosure of evidence the executive must choose between
disclosure or withdrawing charges. This new process means that the prosecu-
tion would not have to choose between keeping material secret or bringing a
prosecution; it will be able to do both.91 There is no monitoring of when or
how this new process has been used,92 bringing to mind the total secrecy of
section 94 and its consequences, nor is there any indication that media or civil
society organisations will be notified if such arrangements are sought in future.
This is particularly worrying given that the Incedal case reportedly came to pub-
lic attention by chance.93 Admittedly, in Incedal the complete blanket of secrecy
was removed, but the substantive result and the procedure used to reach it are
worrying. There is a new but opaque model for departing from open justice
that, with the Court of Appeal’s imprimatur, risks diminishing the transparent
scrutiny of executive actions, has not been subject to parliamentary scrutiny,
and has now emerged as the basis for law reforms.
The creeping influence of Incedal and CMPs
The Law Commission consultation paper treated the Incedal decision as an un-
problematic precedent that provided an acceptable way of excluding the public
from criminal proceedings; that view underpinned the Commission’s proposals
about the way that Official Secrets Act (OSA) offences should be tried. The
88 Incedal [2016] EWCA Crim 11, n 86 above.
89 ibid at [75]. For a non-terrorism national security case see R (on the application of Wang Yam)
(Appellant) v Central Criminal Court and another (Respondents) [2015] UKSC 76 (Wang Yam); on
appeal from [2014] EWHC 3558 (Admin); Yam v United Kingdom (2020) ECHR 31295/11;
[2020] All ER (D) 55 (Jan).
90 P. Scott, ‘An inherent jurisdiction to protect the public interest: from PII to “secret trials”’ (2016)
27 King’s Law Journal 259, 265-266.
91 ibid, 271.
92 The courts in England and Wales have recently established a library of closed judg-
ments: ‘Practice Direction: Closed Judgments’ 14 January 2019 at https://www.judiciary.
uk/announcements/practice-direction-closed-judgments/. Its scope, however, is very un-
clear: L. McNamara, ‘Closed judgments: security, accountability and court processes’ UK
Human Rights Blog, 25 January 2019 at https://ukhumanrightsblog.com/2019/01/25/
closed-judgments-security-accountability-and-court-processes/.
93 H. Irving and J. Townend, ‘Censorship and National Security: Information Control in the Sec-
ond World War and Present Day’ [2016] History & Policy at http://www.historyandpolicy.org/
index.php/policy-papers/papers/censorship-and-national-security-information-control.
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Commission suggested reforming section 8(4) of the OSA 1920, which em-
powers a court to hear a case entirely in private except for passing of sentence,
removing that draconian power but retaining the option of complete secrecy
that, given Incedal, it clearly saw as an entirely tenable option. It proposed ex-
cluding the public only if it is ‘necessary to ensure national safety … is not
prejudiced’.94 The report subsequently put a gloss on that, recommending ex-
clusion only if it ‘must be necessary for the administration of justice having
regard to the risk to national safety’.95 While a necessity test would be an im-
provement on the existing model, the proposed change would still fall well short
of what is required to ensure scrutiny of the executive. In particular, ‘national
safety’ was undefined, rendering the provision vulnerable to broad interpreta-
tion, if not abuse, as demonstrated by the interpretation of a similar phrase in
section 94(4) of the Telecommunications Act. Crucially, the Commission did
not in its consultation paper or report consider the absence of a statutory basis
for the Incedal approach. Significantly, the Commission did not step back from
its consultation view that accepted unquestioningly the Court of Appeal’s po-
sition that the ISC provides an adequate path for executive accountability; as
we have argued above, that position is unconvincing.
In both the consultation and report the Commission observed the contrast
between the development of approaches in criminal and civil proceedings, not-
ing that the JSA provides for CMPs in the latter. The Commission stated that
its ‘aim is not to suggest that the procedure that is applicable in the civil con-
text ought to be imported wholesale into the criminal’.96 However, it added
that reviewing criminal procedure in this area ‘would provide the opportunity
to tailor these powers’ to the criminal context.97 The Commission’s consultation
proposals indicated that it regarded CMPs as now an established fact and form
of procedure and, more importantly, suggest it saw no need to consider rea-
sons why they might not be appropriate and adaptable to a broader range of
circumstances. The report maintains this position, observing that CMPs may
be used in SIAC and under Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures
(TPIMs) proceedings, but does not engage with those developments as either
problematic or as expansions of secrecy.98
The consultation proposals exemplified the way that approaches from one
area of national security could be extended to another without full considera-
tion of the implications. In the report, the treatment of the responses regarding
adapting civil law to criminal needs is cursory; the report recites competing
strands of evidence for and against need for a review to consider adaptation
but engages with neither. The recommendation for a review is ultimately an
94 Law Commission,Consultation Paper n 6 above, para [5.41]. Law Commission Report n 7 above,
para [7.65]; see also paras [7.63] and [7.88] where the Commission states that the ‘primary focus’
is to be on the administration of justice, though it is not clear whether that means open justice
(noting also an apparent typo in the reference to Recommendation 24, as it appears clearly to
be a reference to the text of Recommendation 29).
95 Law Commission Report ibid, para [7.65].
96 Law Commission, Consultation Paper, n 6 above, para [5.53]; Law Commission Report ibid,
para [7.83].
97 Law Commission,Consultation Paper ibid, para [5.59], emphasis added.
98 Law Commission Report n 7 above, para [7.87].
© 2021 The Authors.The Modern Law Review published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Modern Law Review Limited.
(2021) 0(0) MLR 1–28 19
Executive Accountability and National Security
assertion made regardless of evidence rather than because of it.99 It is not an
answer to say the matter is ‘not strictly within our terms of reference’; if a rec-
ommendation is made – and it was – then that should oblige the Commission
to engage with the critiques in the evidence.100 In failing to do so it neglects
the conflation of the ways in which secrecy is managed in Incedal and CMPs.
It places them on a single scale for managing secrecy and security, with the
result that exceptionalism in criminal and civil law are uncritically combined
on a single legal landscape. This is problematic because they are fundamentally
different. In Incedal the criminal defendant could hear the evidence relied on by
the state, but in CMPs the non-state party may be denied access to evidence re-
lied on by the state. This has consequences for transparency and accountability
because taking the civil provisions and principles into criminal cases will fur-
ther and systematically diminish the ability to scrutinise executive behaviour.
The Commission viewed one of the factors in the balance as being upholding
the principle of open justice but this is misguided; the JSA is not concerned
with open justice, it dispenses with it.101 The legislature rejected the ‘open’
administration of justice as a criterion and the JSA refers instead to the ‘effec-
tive’ administration of justice.102 In the Incedal approach, open justice is severely
contracted but equality of arms remains insofar as the defendant is able to hear
the evidence relied on by the prosecution, and the possibility of some media
scrutiny is retained.103 CMPs,however, have stronger limits on open justice and
equality of arms. Even if one accepts that the Commission was cautious in tak-
ing no substantive view about adapting the civil provisions for criminal cases,
the very fact that this appeared an untroubling option in the consultation stage
suggests a disturbing sanguinity to undermining rights and protections in the
criminal process. That speaks to the lack of consideration given to the wider
national security legal framework,which is characterised by concessions to ex-
ecutive control and systemic weaknesses in accountability mechanisms, and the
failure to identify persistent exceptionalism as the context in which its reform
proposals are made and which they would bolster.
The changes in criminal and civil proceedings plainly raise concerns for ac-
countability. They take place against a backdrop in which national security ex-
ceptionalism facilitates the transposition of rules dealing with a specific issue
to a broader range of applications. The judicial role has not been exempt from
these trends and warrants particular attention.
99 ibid, paras [7.90]-[7.100].
100 By way of disclosure, parts of our own evidence was among one strand cited by the Commission
in its report: ibid, paras [7.94]-[7.95].
101 Law Commission,Consultation Paper n 6 above, para [5.52]. It retained this view in the report:
ibid, para [7.83]. The report cites our statement that the JSA dispenses with open justice (para
[7.95]) but does not engage with that.
102 Justice and Security Act 2013, s 6(5).Moves to incorporate open justice considerations into the
Bill, after inclusion at Lords committee stage, were later defeated: HL Deb vol 740 col 1812-
1860 21 November 2012; Public Bill Committee Proceedings, 5 February 2013, Amendment
55; Hansard HC Deb vol 559 col 685-752 4 March 2013.
103 The Incedal approach could, however, present other implications for access to justice. This was
contended inWang Yam n 89 above, in which the appellant (unsuccessfully) argued,under Article
34 ECHR, that he should be permitted to refer to in camera material relating to his defence in
his application to the European Court of Human Rights.
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JUDICIAL COMMISSIONERS: THE BLURRED BOUNDARY OF
REGULATORY AND JUDICIAL OVERSIGHT
Executive accountability has long been viewed in terms of the relationships be-
tween the three branches of government but with the passage of the IPA 2016
– and arguably a partial attempt to respond to the oversight failures surround-
ing the use of section 94 directions – there has been a blurring of executive
and judicial boundaries in the creation of ‘judicial commissioners’ to provide
oversight of the SIAs.
The absence of bright lines of judicial power is not always problematic. On
the contrary, a flexible deployment of judges may increase public confidence in
scrutiny of matters and might even be ‘incontestably to the benefit of good gov-
ernment’.104 However, attention to the nature of and rationales for judicial roles
– more sharply separated from other branches of government since the Con-
stitutional Reform Act 2005 – helps illuminate the constitutional framework
and the ways in which integrity and accountability are ensured.With national
security exceptionalism pervading institutions and mechanisms so as to limit
accountability to parliament, the blurring of judicial and executive boundaries
is troubling and significant.
The judicial function
In the UK there is no circumscription of judicial power that is found in other
common law jurisdictions.105 Nevertheless, the archetypal function of judges is
to interpret and apply the law in the resolution of disputes. Judges are valued for
their skills in analysing evidence,managing parties’ interests and making deter-
minations, but also because judicial independence gives rise to confidence that
conclusions will be based on evidence, rather than political or other needs.106
Institutional and individual independence ensures that decisions will be made
without influence and visible independence from other branches of govern-
ment safeguards confidence in the legal system.There are, however,well estab-
lished departures from that view of the judicial role, some of which arise and
function effectively precisely because the judiciary is independent, and because
that independence is respected and valued by the executive and legislature.
104 Wilson v Minister for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs [1996] HCA 18 at [30] per Kirby J,
dissenting; for a critique of the public confidence rationale, see E. Handsley, ‘Public confidence
in the judiciary:A red herring for the separation of judicial power’ (1998) 20 Sydney Law Review
183.
105 Mistretta v United States 488 US 361 (1989), 407;Wilson v Minister for Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander Affairs ibid at [25] per Brennan CJ,Dawson, Toohey,McHugh and Gummow JJ;Grollo v
Palmer (1995) 184 CLR 348, 365 per Brennan CJ, Deane, Dawson and Toohey JJ;R v Kirby ex
parte Boilermakers’ Society of Australia (1956) 94 CLR 254;Hilton v Wells (1985) 157 CLR 57; F.
Wheeler, ‘The use of federal judges to discharge executive functions’ (1996) 11Australian Institute
of Administrative Law Forum 1; P. Emerton and H.P. Lee, ‘Judges and non-judicial functions in
Australia’ in H.P. Lee (ed), Judiciaries in Comparative Perspective (New York, NY: CUP, 2011).
106 Select Committee on Public Administration,Government by Inquiry Vol 1, HC 51-1 (2004).
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Among these departures is the appointment of judges to conduct inquiries
into issues of public importance. There has long been concern that such ap-
pointments do not sit well with the judicial role, but it is now well-established
practice.107 While the view has traditionally been that appointments of judges
to inquiries are not an exercise of the judicial function, one former Lord Chief
Justice considered ‘the provision of a suitably qualified judge to conduct an
inquiry [is] an important part of the duties of the judiciary … [and] an impor-
tant part of our constitutional framework.’108 A corollary of this is that ‘general
constitutional principles concerning judicial independence must apply.’109 This
has practical consequences; for example, the Lord Chief Justice must consent to
a judge chairing and a judge cannot be questioned by parliament.110
At what point, however, do judges cease to exercise an adjudicatory (or
where relevant, independent inquiry) function and become closer to the role
of systemic reviewer or even decision-maker within the administrative state?111
While inquiries might be seen as part of public administration their ad hoc nature
means they do not form part of a regulatory structure.112 The independence
of regulators and judges is quite different: regulators derive their independence
from statute,whereas judicial independence is constitutional. The nature of ju-
dicial commissioners’ independence under the IPA 2016 is unclear and, as a
consequence, the extent to which they are distinct from the executive and can
hold the executive to account requires consideration.
The Investigatory Powers Act: a changing judicial role?
The patchwork of commissioners overseeing aspects of surveillance each uses
an oversight model that is regulatory (in the sense described above) but which
is reliant on judicial independence.113 The established nature of these positions
distinguishes them from the ad hoc posts created for inquiries, making them
more like independent regulatory authorities. These commissioners reviewed,
but did not approve, the work of the SIAs and the exercise of surveillance pow-
ers.Unlike many regulators, however, the Commissioners were not selected for
107 S. Sedley, ‘Public Inquiries:A Cure or a Disease?’ (1989) 52 MLR 469; J.Beatson, ‘Should judges
conduct inquiries’ (2005) 121 LQR 221; Select Committee on Public Administration, ibid, esp
ch 3.
108 Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, ‘The future of public inquiries’ [2015] Public Law 225, 234-235.
109 ibid, 234.
110 ibid, 235.
111 For exampleWilson v Minister for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs n 104 above.
112 Regulators form part of the executive branch of government having the responsibility for im-
plementation and oversight of policy, mainly against private actors, sometimes having a quasi-
judicial function in the determination of breach of rules (whether as a result of the regulator’s
investigation or as a result of complaints by third parties), and will generally be independent.
That independence cannot easily be overridden even on the grounds of national security:R (on
the application of VIP Communications Ltd) v Secretary of State for the Home Department and the Office
of Communications [2019] EWHC 994 (Admin) on the interpretation of Communications Act
2003, s 5.
113 There is a contrast here with commissioners established under the Protection of Freedoms Act
2012; they are not required to be judges but they are not focussed on oversight of SIAs.
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technocratic expertise but instead because of their independence,with appoint-
ments typically being retired senior judges. Arguably, their incorporation into
the service of the executive had little impact on judicial independence as they
no longer carried out judicial roles.
Building on these models, the IPA 2016 further obfuscates the boundaries of
the judicial role by creating ‘judicial commissioners’ to provide oversight of the
exercise of investigatory powers, and specifically to participate in the approval of
warrants.114 The IPA 2016 established the Investigatory Powers Commissioner
(IPC) and the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office (IPCO), replacing
the existing commissioners and their offices. The IPA 2016 continues the es-
tablished Commissioner model, as the IPC must be a person who ‘holds or
has held a high judicial office’, as must any other commissioners supporting the
IPC.115 However, the IPA 2016 creation of judicial commissioners marks a new
and very important part of the judicial role for two reasons. The first builds on
traditional features, but the second is a radical departure.
First, the model aspires to be more significantly underpinned by judicial in-
dependence than its predecessors.This is evident in three ways: from the process
for appointment and removal, the standing of the office’s inaugural occupant,
and the scale of the operation. This underpinning is valuable and largely con-
sistent with traditional conceptions of the judicial role and independence. The
Prime Minister appoints the IPC and Commissioners for three-year renewable
terms but they must be jointly recommended by the heads of the judiciary of
England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, and by the Lord Chancel-
lor.116 Removal requires a resolution of both Houses of Parliament.117 While
the PrimeMinister’s powers are limited and the process suggests a robust respect
for judicial independence, concerns were raised while the Bill was in draft.118
Even if the Prime Minister in reality has little to do with the appointment,119 it
is questionable whether, as required by Convention jurisprudence,120 a Judicial
Commissioner is perceived as independent. Turning to the scale of the opera-
tion, resources will inevitably be at issue because a key element of independence
is adequate funding. As the outgoing IoCC observed, ‘The appearance of in-
dependence is undermined if one has to go through the minister whose work
one is supervising.’121 Very substantial resources have, however, been commit-
ted to IPCO,with over 50 staff and 15 commissioners.Thus, in form, substance
114 We note that the Biometrics Commissioner,who need not be a judge,may make decisions about
retention and use in individual cases but not about warrants: Protection of Freedoms Act 2012,
s 20.
115 Investigatory Powers Act 2016, s 227(2).
116 Investigatory Powers Act 2016, s 227(3)-(4), 228(2)-(3).
117 Investigatory Powers Act 2016, s 228(4).
118 Report of the Joint Committee on the Draft Investigatory Powers Bill HL 93, HC 651 (11 February
2016), paras [594]-[597]; the removal proposals were strengthened after the Joint Committee
reported.
119 Lord Judge, Oral Evidence to the Joint Committee on the Investigatory Powers Bill HC 651
(2 December 2015), Q 59 at https://www.parliament.uk/documents/joint-committees/
draft-investigatory-powers-bill/oral-evidence-draft-investigatory-powers-committee.pdf ; see
also Report of the Joint Committee on the Investigatory Powers Bill , ibid, paras [580]-[588].
120 Zakharov v Russia [2015] ECHR 1065, [257]-[260].
121 Sir Stanley Burnton, Oral Evidence to the Joint Committee on the Investigatory Powers Bill n 119
above, Q 57.
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and scale, the establishment of the IPC and IPCO constitutes a significant and
new departure from the established conceptualisation of the judicial role in a
way that earlier Commissioner models did not. It relies on core components
of institutional and individual independence, most notably where warrants do
not require judicial approval but are subjected to a so-called ‘double lock’ that
for its legitimacy and effectiveness relies on judicial independence more than
judicial power. That independence is weaker with three-year terms, but there
is a measure of protection insofar as a judicial commissioner is unlikely to be
removed for political reasons. Most importantly, the extent to which judicial
commissioners have the independence of judges is necessary (though not of it-
self sufficient) for effective oversight of executive action. In constitutional terms,
the regime has the hallmarks Lord Thomas saw in the judicial chairing of public
inquiries: ‘the provision of a suitably qualified judge … [is] an important part
of the duties of the judiciary … and an important part of our constitutional
framework.’122 That is a strength, but it is one that simultaneously carries risks
because of the positioning and limits of commissioners’ powers in an oversight
model with constraints on public reporting
Secondly,and radically, the role of judicial commissioners under the IPA 2016
is extensive in scope, which puts more stress on the established conceptions of
judicial independence and separation of powers than would occur if it was
narrow in scope, and thus makes the blurred boundary particularly significant.
Commissioners’ responsibilities are wide, wider than those of the commission-
ers under RIPA 2000, covering numerous aspects of surveillance approval and
oversight.123 In deciding whether or not to approve a warrant, a commissioner
must review the executive conclusions about whether it is necessary on relevant
grounds, and whether the conduct the warrant authorises is proportionate to
the objective of the warrant.The Commissioner is to ‘apply the same principles
as would be applied by a court on an application for judicial review.’124 There is
also a general limitation that judicial commissioners should have regard to pri-
vacy rights.125 However, these processes are not the same as those that ordinarily
characterise judicial review or even proceedings that use CMPs.
There are limits to how effective the judicial commissioner model can be
as a regime that holds the executive to account. Commissioners are exercis-
ing an oversight function from within the Executive. This is apparent in several
ways. The model is quite different from that envisioned in the original rec-
ommendations of the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, which
were that in most instances the Secretary of State should apply for a warrant and
a judge should decide whether to authorise it.126 Commissioners must always
122 Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, n 108 above, 234-235.
123 Investigatory Powers Act 2016, ss 23, 77, 89, 108, 140, 159, 179, 208, 252-254. They include
approving warrants issued by the executive for interception, identification or confirmation of
journalistic sources, retention of communications data, equipment interference, bulk intercep-
tion and acquisition, bulk personal datasets, and general ‘national security notices’ that require
a telecommunications operator to ‘take such specified steps as the Secretary of State considers
necessary in the interests of national security’.
124 For example Investigatory Powers Act 2016, s 23.
125 Investigatory Powers Act 2016, s 2.
126 Anderson, n 21 above, [14.47]-[14.57].
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have regard to national security as the prime consideration.127 Other matters
– including privacy, necessity and proportionality – must also be considered128
but executive views about national security and the particular context will in-
evitably carry exceptional weight and demand deference. In its wider oversight
functions of audit, inspection and investigation the IPC is expressly limited by
section 229(6) under which he ‘must not act in a way [he considers to be]
contrary to the public interest or prejudicial to (a) national security, (b) the
prevention or detection of serious crime, or (c) the economic well-being of
the United Kingdom’.129 Moreover, Judicial Commissioners will not hear inter
partes arguments.130 Without adversarial challenge or at least a special advocate
(however problematic the latter may be), the Commissioner must both identify
the arguments that a person affected might put, and judge those arguments.
The IPA 2016 has resulted in a comprehensive, centralised system that takes
the judicial role – and sitting judges – if not into the executive, then beyond
and outside the traditional conceptions of the judiciary. This move relies on an
independent judiciary and a clear separation of powers, yet simultaneously risks
compromising them. The IPC has stated that ‘Judicial Commissioners will act
totally independently of government,’131 but the IPA 2016 limits the powers
of review and requires deference to ministerial judgment on national security
decision-making.While individual and institutional independence of Commis-
sioners approaches what might be expected of the constitutional protections for
the judiciary, the limits of oversight powers and the approval of executive actions
(rather than judicial authorisation on application) seem to align more closely
with oversight positioned within the executive. There are other, fundamental
ways Judicial Commissioners do not act as the judiciary.They are not conduct-
ing a judicial review of executive action (and so appear to be acting as a part of
the executive, albeit with an oversight function) and cannot keep under review
the exercise of any function by a judicial authority132 (and such a limit would
also be characteristic of an executive function). The shift from a sitting judge
being IPC to a retired judge (as with the earlier commissioners) is also signifi-
cant: it reduces the constitutional and institutional conflict but the power and
independence of a sitting judge may make for more effective accountability. It
is too soon to tell whether this is a harbinger of more permanent change.
In the end, the constitutional location of Judicial Commissioners is am-
biguous. There is much to be said for the role of Judicial Commissioners be-
ing set out explicitly in statute, and for an oversight mechanism respecting
judicial independence. However, the development of Judicial Commissioners
with a broad and expanding133 range of responsibilities in relatively short time
127 For example Investigatory Powers Act 2016, ss 2(4), 23(2) and its references to ss 2, 20, 21.
128 Investigatory Powers Act 2016, s 2.
129 Investigatory Powers Act 2016, s 227 (definitions), s 229, esp s 229(6); Explanatory notes, ‘Com-
mentary on provisions of the Act’, para [640].
130 Lord Pannick QC, ‘Safeguards provide a fair balance on surveillance powers’ The Times 12
November 2015.
131 IPCOPress release,18October 2017 at https://www.ipco.org.uk/docs/JC%20Announcement%
2020171018.pdf
132 Investigatory Powers Act 2016, s 229(4).
133 IPCO now has responsibility for the Consolidated Guidance to Intelligence Officers and Service
Personnel on the Detention and Interviewing of Detainees Overseas,and on the Passing and Re-
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represents a fixture on the constitutional landscape that affects the institutional
role of the judiciary and blurs the boundary between executive and judicial
functions.There is a stark contrast with the role of judges conducting inquiries:
whereas that was viewed as a departure for at least a century prior to Lord
Thomas’ position that it is a part of the judicial role, the role of judges as com-
missioners has occurred in far quicker time and with far less controversy.Against
this background, the Law Commission proposals can be seen clearly as an ac-
ceptance, without remark, of this new system.
Building on the IPA 2016 foundations: the Law Commission proposals
The Law Commission adopted the IPA 2016 judicial commissioner model as
a cure for all ills. It proposed and then recommended a new statutory com-
missioner to address serious concerns of current or former SIA staff. It did so
without considering the specific purpose for which the IPA 2016 was brought
into being, nor the many debates and concerns at the time, or the fact that
much of European jurisprudence expresses a preference for judicial oversight
of surveillance through the courts. The Commission is, however, at its best
where the report recommends a public interest disclosure defence for whistle-
blowers to ‘fortify’ the statutory commissioner role.134 Engaging with the evi-
dence it notes that the aim is not merely Article 10 compliance, but ‘a fair law
that takes seriously the public interests in national security and in accountable
Government’.135 Our concern nonetheless remains that adopting the judicial
commissioner model in new circumstances recognises neither the difficulties
with the model nor the way it shifts still further from the now well-accepted
role of judges conducting inquiries. These unexamined structural matters are
not remedied by a public interest disclosure defence.
What can be seen in the emergence of the judicial commissioner model as
established by the IPA 2016 is an expansion of the judicial role, with judges
exercising power over the executive, but not clearly from outside the execu-
tive branch of government. This is not necessarily an insurmountable problem,
especially as the model – at least in the IPA 2016 framework – substantially
respects judicial independence both in form and substance.What is a problem,
however, is that this shift has occurred without a discussion or acknowledg-
ment of the changed constitutional role, especially if this changed role covers
wider ground. Judicial commissioners have become actors with a general and
ever-expanding remit, yet an ill-defined place in the constitution. The Law
Commission proposals are an indicator of the extent to which the new judi-
cial commissioner role is viewed as a go-to panacea for the executive’s security
ceipt of Intelligence Relating to Detainees, and oversight over UK-US Data Access Agreement,
but is not involved in approving requests: The Functions of the Investigatory Powers Commis-
sioner (Oversight of the Data Access Agreement between the United Kingdom and the United
States of America and of functions exercisable under the Crime (Overseas Production Orders)
Act 2019) Regulations 2020 (draft at the time of writing).
134 Law Commission Report n 7 above, paras [8.66]-[8.128].
135 ibid, para [8.127].
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needs. That trend is worrying. An examination of the practical and constitu-
tional concerns would alleviate the risk of such a rush to simplistic adaptation.
The constitutional scope and limits of the judicial role in this area need to be
articulated; uncertainty and ambiguity here are undesirable because of the risk
of retreat from modern accountability benchmarks.
CONCLUSION
The context for this article is the constitutional tensions between executive ac-
countability for actions done for national security reasons, the transparency and
information flow required to facilitate executive accountability, and the pub-
lic interest in protecting national security,which may require some secrecy.We
have noted a series of statutes – particularly those putting the SIAs on a statutory
footing – which have constrained the scope and exercise of prerogative power.
The move towards some parliamentary control in this area is to be welcomed.
The result of the changes, however, is not the normal application of constitu-
tional principles but instead sees the use of special frameworks and approaches
that privilege executive control and secrecy, with a lack of transparency. This
exceptionalism occurs across the institutions of the state. It is apparent in the na-
tional security exception in section 94, in the executive controls over reporting
to parliament and in its influence over the ISC. The principles of open justice
have been diluted in both civil and criminal cases and ‘extra-statutory’ regimes
have been developed and expanded. While the IPC as a quasi-regulator (the
status of which in itself raises constitutional questions) oversees the SIAs, the
actions of those overseen are never fully brought into the light. The IPC and
judicial commissioner roles were established in response to a lack of effective
controls over surveillance but are at risk of being treated as the solution for all
national security challenges without consideration of the implications of taking
that path.
Whether or not each of the examples considered constitutes an appropriate
balance between the needs of national security and principles of control and
accountability is an important question,but our concern is different. It relates to
the use of existing compromises and exceptions in new situations and the way
that exceptional solutions are then applied in contexts broader than originally
envisaged or for which they were designed, especially in the light of new tech-
nologies or new threats. Such application is not automatically wrong; indeed,
we accept that the consideration of existing models for balancing competing
interests is a practical starting point for the resolution of conflicting imperatives.
Nonetheless,we consider that the tendency (as we have demonstrated) has been
simply to adopt the model, sometimes in new contexts, without consideration
of the systemic consequences. While that may have been forgiveable in indi-
vidual instances, the scale and scope of deployment means that is no longer the
case.
The fact of acceptance and the subsequent re-use of a model is a process
through which the exceptions become entrenched.This risks the normalisation
of particular models that are premised on indirect accountability and thus the
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persistence of exceptionalism, executive control and limited accountability, but
utilising parliamentary and judicial mechanisms rather than prerogative powers.
Against this background we suggest that when considering existing models as
reference points for further reform, both the weakness and the strengths of
these models should be considered, as well as the context in which they have
operated.
Individual compromises should not be seen in isolation.The acceptability of
exceptionalism in one area is informed by its acceptability in others. Taken to-
gether, they may have a significant impact on our understanding of the constitu-
tion, effectively re-asserting the specialness of national security generally, rather
than in specific, identified and justified contexts. The individual instances we
discuss may be the tip of the iceberg representing a more fundamental change,
most notably as regards the mechanisms to ensure executive accountability.The
contribution of this article, at least in part,has been to demonstrate the extent to
which techniques to address concerns in one context have been redeployed de-
spite significant concerns about their operation which have not been resolved.
Viewed through that prism, a key issue is the need to distinguish between
oversight, accountability and transparency. It becomes apparent that in national
security matters accountability is not based on transparency with information
open to all (in principle), but instead relies on oversight regimes where what
might be called a ‘trusted intermediary’ is provided with some information,
but is constrained on how it may use or disclose that information. Oversight
operates on the basis that someone sees, but that is a form of accountability
which is more limited and in which the ability to sanction (in many respects
generally weak) is weaker still; these limitations tend not to be discussed. Our
concern is that executive accountability becomes diluted in ways that give the
misleading appearance of accountability. Moreover the danger of disregarding
the cumulative effect of these changes is that there will be a temptation – when
faced with new challenges whether within the security field or not – to replicate
these models without reflection and that with that replication comes the risk
of an irreversible shift in the constitutional balance.
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